Towards an Understanding of Shared Understanding in Military Coalition Contexts by Smart, Paul R et al.
Towards an Understanding of 
Shared Understanding
in Military Coalition Contexts
Paul R. Smart, Trung Dong Huynh, David Mott, Katia 
Sycara, Dave Braines,
Michael Strub, Winston Sieck and Nigel R. ShadboltOverview
• Shared understanding seems to be a construct 
of considerable importance to coalition 
operations
– identified as ITA hard problem area.
• But what does the term „shared understanding‟ 
actually mean?
• How should we define shared understanding?
• How should we distinguish shared 
understanding from shared situational 
awareness (SAA) and shared mental models 
(SMM).
2Aims
• Improve our understanding of understanding 
and shared understanding.
• Explore the differences between:
– understanding, situation awareness and mental models
– shared understanding, shared situation awareness and shared 
mental models
• Propose reasons why shared understanding is 
important for military coalitions.
• Identify areas for future research.
3Understanding Understanding
• Approach
– review ideas of later Wittgenstein
– examine how the term „understanding‟ is used 
in different contexts
• perception, language, intentional actions, 
situations
– explore why it is difficult to understand 
understanding
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“to understand understanding is a task to be attempted 
and not to be achieved today, or even tomorrow”
- Paul Ziff (1972)Understanding and Ability
• Wittgenstein
– understanding is akin to an 
ability
• Categorization Errors
– understanding is not a feeling or 
experience
– understanding is not a mental 
state
– understanding is not a mental 
process
5Sensory Sensemaking
• Perception depends on more than an ability to 
detect stimuli; it also depends on an ability to 
make sense of them – to understand them.
• Surgical interventions often restore visual 
sensation but not „sight‟
– Oliver Sacks – To See and Not See
• “To see one must have visual impressions that 
one understands” (Noë, 2004)
• Phenomenal experience is predicated on a 
knowledge of „sensorimotor dependencies‟.
6Understanding in Action
• The understanding of intentional 
action.
• Ability to predict, account and 
explain other people‟s actions
• Mental simulation and mirror 
neurons:
– neurons that are active when we 
perform an action are also active 
when we observe others doing the 
same action
– the basis of empathy?
– the basis of language understanding?
7Language Understanding
• Understanding a language is a matter of being 
able to do things.
• Understanding is akin to an ability:
– to understand a sentence is to be able to do things 
that involve the sentence, e.g. to apply it correctly, to 
paraphrase it and to respond to it in appropriate ways
– to understand a word is, inter alia, to be able to use it 
correctly
8Situational Understanding
• Understanding of situations
– evidenced by an ability to explain how the current 
situation, or elements thereof, came to be as they are
– evidenced by an ability to predict how the current 
situation may develop or evolve in the future
• Predictive and explanatory capabilities seem to 
be driven by a knowledge of causal relationships
– an ability to „see more then meets the eye‟
• Seeing more than meets the eye may be 
common to many types of understanding.
9What is Understanding?
• Understanding is NOT a feeling, a state, or a 
process.
• Understanding is similar to an ability....
• ...but it is not identical to an ability.
• Understanding is evidenced by our descriptive, 
explanatory and predictive successes regarding 
the object of understanding, but there does not 
seem to be any firm basis for saying that 
understanding is a particular form of ability, e.g. 
an ability to predict or explain something.
10Shared Understanding?
• Shared understanding is an ability (or something similar 
to an ability) that is common to multiple agents.
• But commonality of abilities does not seem to require 
commonality of performances
– the performances manifesting understanding may be many and 
varied
• Shared understanding is often seen as important for 
„unity of effort‟
– clearly, in this case, the performances of specific coalition 
elements will not be the same – it is more their complementarity 
or compatibility (relative to some goal) that is important
• Perhaps similarity of performances is sufficient but not 
necessary for conclusions about shared understanding.
11Mental Models
• Mental Models (MMs):
• Notion of mental models is clearly related to our notion of 
understanding.
• MMs can, we suggest, be cast as an enabling 
mechanism for understanding.
• MMs provide a mechanistic realization of the specific 
performances that warrant ascriptions of understanding 
to an agent.
• MMs are not identical to understanding because abilities 
cannot be reduced to their vehicles. 12
“...mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of 
system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and 
observed system states, and predictions of future system states” (Rouse & 
Morris, 1986)Situation Awareness
• Situation awareness
• SA seems to subsume understanding
– perception, comprehension and projection.
• SA is best conceived of as a particular form of 
understanding - dynamic situational understanding 
(DSU).
• DSU is evidenced by descriptive, explanatory and 
predictive performances that may be driven by MMs.
– provides us with a potential theoretical integration of SA, MM 
and understanding(?)
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“...the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
space and time, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of 
their status in the near future.” (Endsley, 1995)SA and Understanding
• Disputes about SA, e.g. 
– state/process duality
– possibility of implicit SA
• We can resolve these disputes by casting SA as 
a form of understanding:
– SA is neither a mental state nor a mental process 
because understanding is neither a mental state nor a 
mental process
– SA is neither implicit or explicit because 
understanding is neither implicit nor explicit
– folks on both sides of the debate are mistaken 
14SU and Military Coalitions
• The importance of shared understanding:
– improved group/team performance
• better coordination, efficient decision-making
– optimal use of limited communication assets
• coalition environments are often resource-constrained environments 
in which power overheads and network traffic must be kept to a 
minimum
• If shared understanding improves the efficiency of inter-agent 
communication (perhaps reducing the need for communication 
altogether), it may contribute to the optimized use of limited network 
assets
– improved psychoaffective outcomes
• SU may be a key ingredient of what it means for someone to be 
regarded as a „team player‟
• promotes group cohesion, solidarity and trust
15Future Work
• How should we operationalize shared understanding?
– probably need situation-specific operational characterizations 
• How do we measure, assess and evaluate shared 
understanding?
– need to specify what would constitute sufficient grounds for the 
ascription of shared understanding
• What are the relevant objects of understanding?
– plans, goals, situations, agent capabilities
• What kind of interventions might be used to improve 
shared understanding?
• What about machine understanding?
16Summary
• Understanding is akin to an ability.
• Shared understanding is a commonality of abilities 
that may be ascribed based on similarity of 
performances.
• Commonality of performances does not seem 
necessary for shared understanding –
complementarity may be more important in coalition 
situations.
• SA is a form of situational understanding that may 
be realized by mental models – requires a 
productive reconceptualization of the SA construct.
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